Introduction
This paper investigates whether sell-side analysts and auditors identify and communicate information about 'low-quality' earnings to investors. We measure earnings quality using a refined version of the accruals technique employed by Sloan (1996) .
Specifically, we show that firms with unusually high working capital accruals are more likely to experience declines in subsequent earnings performance and SEC enforcement actions for GAAP violations. We then investigate whether information about the subsequent earnings declines is reflected in analysts' earnings forecasts and whether information about GAAP violations is reflected in auditors' opinions. We find that sellside analysts' forecast errors are large and negative for firms with unusually high accruals, consistent with analysts failing to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines.
We also find that firms with unusually high accruals are less likely to receive a qualified opinion from their auditors, consistent with auditors failing to anticipate the increased likelihood of GAAP violations.
Our evidence complements and reinforces the evidence provided in Sloan (1996) . Sloan demonstrates that stocks prices act 'as if' investors do not anticipate the subsequent stock price declines associated with unusually high levels of accruals. However, a limitation of Sloan's study is that the relation between the predictable earnings declines and stock prices could be attributable to unidentified risk factors or unknown research design flaws.
We provide direct evidence that sell-side analysts do not fully incorporate the predictable subsequent earnings declines into their forecasts. We also show that auditors do not alert investors to the increased incidence of GAAP violations associated with high accruals.
Our evidence suggests that even professional investment intermediaries who specialize in interpreting accounting information do not identify and communicate information about the subsequent earnings declines. Thus, our evidence supports the hypothesis that investors do not fully anticipate the negative implications of unusually high accruals.
Our evidence also generates insights into the roles played by sell-side analysts and auditors. One interpretation of our results is that sell-side analysts and auditors lack the necessary sophistication to understand the future implications of high levels of accruals.
Another interpretation is that sell-side analysts and auditors collude with management to inflate expectations of future earnings by inflating current accruals, current earnings and forecasts of future earnings. Under either of the above interpretations, our results are consistent with related research suggesting that earnings management can be used to boost stock prices around events such as equity issuances [e.g., Rangan (1998) , Teoh and Wong (1998) ]. Also, under either interpretation, our results call into question the quality of the opinions provided by analysts and auditors.
The next section of this paper develops our hypotheses and research design. Section 3 describes our data and section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses
The question of whether investors 'see through' temporary distortions in accrual accounting numbers is of great interest to both academics and capital market participants.
Perhaps Abraham Briloff has been the best known spokesperson for the view that investors are systematically misled by such distortions [e.g., Briloff (1972) ]. In the 1970s, academics produced a large body of empirical evidence in support of the claim that stock prices act 'as if' investors are extremely sophisticated and see through accounting distortions. This evidence consisted of demonstrating that stock prices respond to earnings information in a timely manner, and that accounting changes do not lead to direct mechanical effects on stock prices. 1 One possible shortcoming of this research is that it may fail to reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency because of the use of low power tests. For example, the fact that stock prices do not respond mechanically to the earnings effects of a FIFO-LIFO switch does not mean that investors also see through more subtle manipulations of revenue recognition or expense capitalization.
More recently, a growing body of evidence has documented significant rejections of market efficiency in favor of the alternative hypothesis that investors respond to current earnings without fully appreciating the implications of the current accounting choices for future earnings and cash flows. For example, Sloan (1996) finds firms with high levels of current accruals experience systematic reductions in future earnings and that stock 1 See Watts (1986) for a review of this research.
prices act 'as if' investors do not anticipate the future earnings declines. He finds that the stock prices of firms with high accruals subsequently decline, and that the magnitude and timing of the subsequent stock price declines are directly related to the magnitude and timing of the predictable declines in earnings. Subsequent research by Xie (1998) finds that the accruals driving the predictable earnings reversals appear to be attributable to earnings management. In related research, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) find that a sample of firms targeted by the SEC for manipulating earnings were able to temporarily raise their stock prices through the use of large positive accounting accruals.
Despite the statistical and economic significance of the recent findings, many academics continue to view the evidence in this area as mixed. For example, in a recent review of earnings management research, Healy and Wahlen (1998) conclude that:
"Findings on resource allocation effects of earnings management are conflicting, suggesting the need for future empirical and theoretical research on this issue."
Perhaps one reason for this view is academics' reluctance to let go of the efficient markets paradigm, as it provides a convenient and parsimonious framework for understanding capital markets. Academics are also concerned that recent research may suffer from research design biases. In particular, there is concern that the observed stock price behavior may be due to unknown risk factors and/or research design biases, such as survivorship biases.
In this paper, we attempt to surmount the above research design issues by focussing directly on the expectations of professional market intermediaries, rather than relying on stock prices. Evidence that the predictable earnings changes are not incorporated in analysts' forecasts is inconsistent with the alternative risk factor and ex-post survivorship bias explanations that have been used to explain prior stock price results. Our hypothesis with respect to auditor opinions is also straightforward. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) demonstrate that firms with high accruals are more likely to be subject to an SEC enforcement action for GAAP violations. We replicate and extend their analysis on our sample and confirm that high accruals are associated with a higher incidence of SEC enforcement actions for GAAP violations. If auditors fail to use information in accruals to identify GAAP violations, then high accruals will not be associated with a greater frequency of qualified opinions. Hence, we hypothesize that auditors are not more likely to issue qualified audit opinions to firms with high accruals, despite the fact that these firms are more likely to have committed GAAP violations.
This hypothesis can be formally stated in its alternative form as:
H2: There is a positive association between the level of current accruals and the probability that the audit opinion will be qualified.
An issue of interpretation arises with this hypothesis, because our position is supported by a failure to reject the null of no association. Of course, we are not the first to propose providing evidence on a hypothesis by setting it up as the null and then failing to reject that null. 3 However, we want to be open about the fact that our failure to reject could be due to low power rather than because the alternative hypothesis is false. Having said this, the standard errors in our empirical tests are such that power is not an issue -any economically significant relations in the data will certainly achieve statistical significance.
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A second limitation of our audit opinion tests is that qualified opinions are infrequent.
Evidence suggests that auditors typically resign or are fired before they get to issue a 2 In an independent and concurrent working paper, Elgers, Lo and Pfeiffer (1999) also examine analysts' ability to incorporate information in accruals in their earnings forecasts. Using a somewhat different research design, they reach the conclusion that analysts do not fully incorporate information in accruals. 3 Most of the literature in support of the efficient markets hypothesis also employs this approach. 4 In related research, Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1998) and Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998) This hypothesis is also subject to the limitation that our position is supported by a failure to reject the null. However, this limitation is again mitigated by the fact that power is not an issue, given our large sample size.
Data
Our empirical tests employ data from three sources. Our accruals tests also involve the examination of future earnings changes. Following
Sloan (1996), we use operating income after depreciation (COMPUSTAT #178) divided by average total assets to measure earnings performance. This definition of earnings excludes special items, and so measures the 'recurring' earnings number that is tracked by analysts and is more highly correlated with stock prices than 'bottom line' measures of earnings that include special items. Our final sample with non-missing accruals, cash flows and earnings data consists of 47,571 firm years. Our stock return tests also require data from the CRSP files. Stock returns are measured using compounded buy-hold returns, inclusive of dividends and other distributions. Market adjusted returns are calculated by deducting the corresponding return on a value-weighted market portfolio.
Size adjusted returns are computed by deducting the corresponding value-weighted return for all available firms in the same size-matched decile, where size is measured using market capitalization. The requirement that CRSP stock return data is available in addition to COMPUSTAT data reduces our sample size to 38,429 observations.
Our analyst forecasts tests are conducted using the median I/B/E/S forecast of annual earnings for the current year. We initially measure the forecast in the month after financial results for the most recent fiscal year have been announced. This is because we want to ensure that the analysts have cash flow and accrual information from the most recent year available to them at the time that they make their forecasts. We then track their forecast errors over the months leading up to the announcement of the current year's earnings. For most firms, this period is 12 months long. Forecast errors are computed by subtracting forecast earnings from realized earnings and dividing by the stock price at the end of the first month in which the forecast is measured (i.e., the month after financial results for the most recent fiscal year have been announced). Imposing the requirement that I/B/E/S forecast data is available reduces the sample size to 22,874 observations.
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Data on audit opinions and auditor changes are obtained from the COMPUSTAT tapes.
COMPUSTAT provides six codes for the audit opinion -unaudited (#0), unqualified (#1), qualified (#2), no opinion (#3), unqualified with explanatory language (#4) and adverse (#5). Only the unqualified opinion (#1) represents an unambiguous clean opinion from the auditors. We therefore create an audit opinion indicator variable that takes on the value of 0 for an unqualified 'clean' opinion and 1 for any of the other 'dirty'
categories. Note that some of the variation in this variable will undoubtedly be attributable to factors other than GAAP violations (e.g., going concern uncertainties and changes in accounting principles). This will reduce the power of our tests, but is not expected to bias our tests in any way. The alternative of manually inspecting all opinions is not cost effective, given that there are over 7,000 'dirty' opinions in our sample. Finally, COMPUSTAT also provides data on the identity of the auditor. We use this data to create a dummy variable coded as 0 if the identity of the auditor is the same as in the previous fiscal year and 1 if there is a change in the identity of the auditor. 
Results

ACCRUALS, EARNINGS AND STOCK PRICES
We begin by replicating Sloan's (1996) results using our later time period and our refined measure of accruals. Recall that Sloan's sample period pre-dates the release of FAS 95, while our sample period post-dates FAS 95. Thus, while Sloan imputes accruals using balance sheet data, we are able to take the accruals directly from the statement of cash flows. Table 1 reports our examination of the contribution of the cash flow and accrual components of earnings to the rate of mean reversion in earnings. This is accomplished by regressing next period's earnings on the cash flow and accrual components of this period's earnings. Coefficients between 0 and 1 on each of this period's earnings 8 We do, however, conduct robustness tests using an alternative measure of our audit opinion variable. Details of these tests are explained in section 4.
components indicate that they contribute to mean reversion in earnings, with a smaller coefficient indicating that the component contributes to more rapid mean reversion.
Panel A reports results using continuous variables, while panel B reports results using decile rankings (which are less sensitive to outliers). We also report results using the two accruals definitions. Accruals 1 represents recurring working capital accruals, while Accruals 2 represents all accruals.
Consistent with Sloan (1996) we find that the coefficients on cash flows and accruals are both between 0 and 1, and that the coefficient on accruals is consistently lower than the coefficient on cash flows. In all regressions, we can easily reject the null of equality on the cash flow and accrual coefficients in favor of the alternative that the coefficient on accruals is less than the coefficient on cash flows. 9 During our sample period, there were several mergers among audit firms. Thus, our procedure will sometimes indicate an auditor change when a merger occurred. This will reduce the power of our tests, but
The results in table 1 are illustrated graphically in figure 1. Figure 1a reports the timeseries behavior of earnings for portfolios of high and low earnings firm-years. Firms are assigned to decile portfolios based on the magnitude of earnings in year 0. The graph illustrates that earnings are slowly mean reverting, and that mean reversion is far from complete even after five years. Figures 1b and 1c report the time-series behavior of earnings for portfolios of high and low accrual and cash flow firm-years respectively.
Accruals are measured using the Accruals 1 variable. Figure 1b illustrates that mean reversion in earnings is rapid for portfolios of firms formed on accruals. There is extreme reversion in the first year, and mean reversion is almost complete after three years. In contrast, figure 1c shows evidence of much slower mean reversion in earnings for accruals formed on cash flows. We next move on to test whether investors anticipate the more rapid earnings mean reversion induced by the accrual component of earnings. This is consistent with the idea that some of these accruals are explicitly flagged as nonrecurring in the income statement, and so the subsequent earnings mean reversion attributable to these accruals is better anticipated by investors. Given that Accruals 1 better captures accruals that are not explicitly flagged as non-recurring, we use this accruals variable exclusively in our remaining tests.
10 Table 3 reports formal tests of market efficiency using the framework developed in Sloan (1996) . The results just corroborate those presented in Sloan using a completely different sample, and so we discuss them very briefly. Market efficiency is easily rejected, and the results suggest that investors act 'as if' they over-estimate the persistence of the accruals component of earnings. For example, in the panel B results using decile rankings, we find that investors should rationally use a persistence coefficient on accruals of γ 1 =0.156, but instead, the expectations embedded in stock prices imply a coefficient of γ 1 * =0.339.
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By contrast, the implied rational and implied persistence coefficients on cash flows are γ 2 =0.311 and γ 2 * =0.338 respectively, indicating that investors expectations correspond closely with the rational expectation. It appears that investors irrationally expect accruals to persist about as strongly as cash flows, when in fact they are only about half as persistent.
In summary, the preceding results provide two basic findings. First, we show that Sloan's (1996) results extend to the post-FAS 95 period. Second, we show that we can improve on Sloan's results by focussing on working capital accruals. These accruals are not explicitly flagged as non-recurring in the income statement, and it appears to be these accruals that drive the mean reversion in earnings that is not anticipated by investors.
ANALYSTS' FORECASTS
In this section, we investigate whether analysts' forecasts of future earnings reflect the predictable mean reversion in earnings associated with high levels of accruals. Our tests are conducted using I/B/E/S consensus (median) forecasts of annual earnings. We measure analysts' expectations of earnings for the forthcoming year immediately following the release of the results for the most recent year. We then stratify the sample based on the magnitude of accruals for the most recent year. If analysts incorporate the predictable mean reversion in earnings associated with accruals, then their forecast errors
should not be a function of the magnitude of the most recent year's accruals. If they do not incorporate the information in accruals, then their forecast errors will be more negative (i.e., more overoptimistic) for firms with higher accruals. We also expect that their forecast errors will gradually correct themselves over the course of the subsequent year, as they revise their forecasts in response to earnings reversals that are revealed through subsequent quarterly earnings announcements. Tests using analyst forecast errors are complicated by the fact that analysts' forecasts are well known to be optimistically biased, resulting in negative average forecast errors [Barefield and Comiskey (1975) ]. Thus, our formal tests are restricted to predicting a negative relation between accruals and forecast errors.
Our basic results are illustrated graphically in Figure 2 respectively. We also plot the sample average forecast errors as a benchmark. The forecast errors are consistently negative for all portfolios at all points in time. This reflects the well-documented average over-optimism in analysts' forecasts. Consistent with our hypothesis, the forecast error for the high accrual portfolio is larger than the forecast error for the low accrual portfolio at all points in time. Moreover, the magnitude of the difference is greatest in month 1, and gradually declines as the year progresses.
This pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that analysts do not initially anticipate the implications of the most recent year's accruals for the subsequent year's earnings.
Moreover, analysts gradually appear to realize the implications of accruals for subsequent earnings as the year progresses. This latter effect is probably due to the gradual release of earnings information through quarterly earnings announcements and preannouncements. The regression coefficient magnitudes provide some indication of the economic significance of the results. The Month 1 regression indicates that a low accrual firm has an average forecast error of -0.0033, while a high accrual firm has an average forecast error of -0.0096 (i.e., -0.0033 + -0.0063). To put these numbers into perspective, the forecast errors are scaled by price and the sample average price-to-earnings ratio is just over 20. Multiplying by an assumed price earnings ratio of 20, these forecast errors translate into 6.6% and 19.2% of reported earnings respectively.
In summary, the results in this section demonstrate that analysts' forecasts do not fully incorporate the predictable earnings reversals associated with extreme levels of accruals.
Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is such that the forecast errors for high accrual firms are almost 20% of reported earnings.
AUDITORS' OPINIONS
Our final set of tests examines whether auditors signal the higher incidence of GAAP violations associated with high accruals through their audit opinions. We begin this section by demonstrating that firms with high accruals are more likely to be subject to SEC enforcement actions for GAAP violations. While these tests represent a relatively straightforward replication and extension of research in Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) , the tests are useful because they provide evidence that firms with high accruals are more likely to be violating GAAP. Given that this is the case, auditors should issue more qualified opinions for high accrual firms if they incorporate information in accruals in reaching their audit opinions. Our basic hypothesis is that audit qualifications are unrelated to the magnitude of accruals, because auditors do not incorporate information in accruals. In addition to examining the contemporaneous association between audit qualifications and accruals, we also examine subsequent audit qualifications and auditor changes. Our motivation for examining subsequent audit qualifications is to see whether auditors only start issuing more qualified opinions when the subsequent earnings reversals and allegations of GAAP violations that are associated with high accruals begin to materialize. Our motivation for examining auditor changes is based on prior evidence that auditors often resign or are fired by management before they get to the point of issuing a qualified audit opinion. Thus, auditor changes provide an alternative method for auditors to signal their concerns with a company's accounting.
Evidence on the relation between accruals and SEC enforcement actions is provided in Our basic results for audit opinions are presented in table 6. Our tests are based on regressions of an audit opinion dummy variable on accrual portfolio rank (PortAcc) and a variety of control variables. The audit opinion variable (Unclean) is assigned the value of 0 for a 'plain vanilla' unqualified opinion and the value of 1 for any other opinion, including qualified, adverse or unqualified with explanatory language (e.g., ability to continue as a going concern). Finer partitions of the audit opinion might be possible based on the nature and severity of the opinion. However, for our main empirical tests, we use the simple partition of coding the opinion as either completely 'clean', or qualified in some way. 13 We estimate the regression using a logit model, because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. Our controls are based on variables identified in previous research that has modeled audit opinions [e.g., Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich (1987) ; Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) ]. The control variables that we use are firm size (a control for stability), cash from operations (a control for performance that is unrelated to accrual accounting), leverage (a control for long-term solvency) and timesinterest-earned (a control for short-term solvency and liquidity). The remaining three columns of table 6 examine audit opinions over the subsequent three years. The audit opinion and control variables are each measured contemporaneously 13 We also replicated our results using an audit opinion indicator variable taking the value of 0 for both straight unqualified opinions and opinions that are unqualified with explanatory language. All of the key over the next three years respectively. PortAcc continues to measure the decile accrual ranking as of year 0. The objective of these regressions is to see whether audit opinions only begin to respond to the information in accruals when it finally begins to translate into subsequent earnings reversals. The results indicate that the coefficient on PortAcc remains negative, but declines in economic and statistical significance. Thus, it appears that auditors are less likely to issue clean audit opinions to firms with high accruals once the subsequent earnings reversals and allegations of GAAP violations begin to materialize. However, there is no evidence that auditors' opinions alert investors to the increased incidence of GAAP violations associated with high accruals on a timely basis. Table 7 appears that the earnings reversals and allegations of GAAP violations that follow periods of high accruals lead to auditor changes. However, in the high accrual years during which the GAAP violations actually occur, there is no evidence that auditor changes provide timely information to investors.
Conclusions
Firms with extremely high accruals experience subsequent reductions in earnings and are more likely to be subject to SEC enforcement actions for GAAP violations. In this paper, we show that analysts do not anticipate the earnings reductions in their earnings forecasts, and auditors do not signal the GAAP violations through their audit opinions. Previous research has demonstrated that stock prices act 'as if' investors do not anticipate negative future consequences associated with high accruals. Our findings reinforce this interpretation by demonstrating that even professional investment intermediaries do not communicate the negative information associated with high accruals to investors.
Our results add to the growing body of evidence pointing to the conclusion that accrual accounting leads to temporary resource misallocation. That is not to say that other systems, such as cash accounting, would result in better resource allocation. It does, however, undermine the role of the efficient market hypothesis, on which academics have relied to gloss over many of the features of the accrual accounting system that seem to preoccupy managers and investors. For example, the evidence is consistent with the idea that earnings management can temporarily move firms' stock prices. Indeed, recent research suggests that firms successfully use earnings management to increase their stock prices during equity offerings [Rangan (1998); Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) ].
These findings provide many opportunities for future research, which may have important implications for the practice of accounting. For example, it would be useful to gain additional insights into the extent to which the accrual-induced earnings reversals are due to earnings management versus neutral application of the GAAP accounting system. Preliminary research by Xie (1998) suggests that earnings management is responsible for the reversals. It would also be useful to establish whether analysts and auditors are genuinely unaware of the accrual-induced earnings reversals, or whether they collude with management to temporarily manipulate firms' stock prices. Finally, we should seek a better understanding of why investors appear to be 'fooled' by the predictable, accrual-induced earnings reversals. One of the purposes of FAS 95 was to make cash flows underlying earnings more transparent to investors. However, our results suggest that investors appear to anticipate the earnings reversals no more effectively than in the pre-FAS 95 era. t-5 t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Mean Earnings
Low Cash Flows High Cash Flows a The figures present mean earnings relative to portfolio formation year t based on rankings of Earnings, Accruals 1 , and CashFlows. Firm-year observations are ranked annually and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on Earnings, Accruals 1 , and CashFlows rankings.
Earnings is operating income after depreciation; Accruals 1 equals the change in working capital accounts on the statement of cash flows (Accruals 1 , discussed in the text); CashFlows is cash flows from operations on the statement of cash flows. All variables are scaled by average total assets. The figures present mean earnings for deciles 1 ('Low') and 10 ('High') for each ranking. The sample size in year t is 47,571 firm-years spanning 1988-1997.
FIGURE 2 Analyst Forecast Errors for Deciles of Accruals Portfolios in the 12 Months Following the Previous Year's Earnings Announcement a
a This figure presents mean forecast errors for months leading up to the annual earnings number being forecast. Month 1 is the first month following the prior year's earnings announcement, month 2 is the second month following the prior year's earnings announcement, and so on. Monthly Forecast Errors are calculated as realized earnings minus forecasted earnings in month t, all scaled by stock price in month 1. Firm-year observations are ranked annually and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on Accruals 1 . Accruals 1 equals the change in working capital accounts on the statement of cash flows (e.g. items 302, 303, 304, 305 and 307 in COMPUSTAT) , scaled by average total assets. The figure presents mean forecast errors for deciles 1 ('Low Accruals') and 10 ('High Accruals'), as well as the overall sample ('All Observations'). Sample sizes are approximately 2,000 firm-years per decile in each month, and constitute observations in the initial sample of 47,571 firm-years for which analyst forecasts are available in month 1 on the I/B/E/S summary statistics file. Returns are calculated for three years after portfolio formation. Annual returns are calculated from the start of the fifth month subsequent to the fiscal year-end in which firms are assigned to portfolios. Market adjusted returns are calculated by deducting the value-weighted market portfolio from the raw returns. The size-adjusted returns are calculated by deducting the market returns for all firms in the size-matched decile, where size is measured as market capitalization. The sample size in each column represents the subsample of the initial COMPUSTAT sample (47, 571, (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) with available returns on the CRSP tapes. Individual portfolio sample sizes vary across portfolios from a low of 1,457 (year t+3) to a high of 4,064 (year t+1). The sample constitutes observations in the initial sample of 47,571 firm-years for which analyst forecasts are available in month 1 on the I/B/E/S summary statistics file. FError s,t+1 is the monthly forecast error in month s following the announcement of year t earnings (i.e. prior year). Month s=1 is the first month following the prior year's earnings announcement, month s=2 is the second month following the prior year's earnings announcement, and so on. FError s,t+1 is calculated as forecasted earnings in month s minus the realized earnings for year t+1, scaled by stock price in month 1. PortAcc is the portfolio ranking of the firm-year based on Accruals 1 in year t, scaled to a [0,1] scale. Accruals 1 is calculated as the net change in working capital accounts as shown on the statement of cash flows (e.g. items 302, 303, 304, 305 and 307 in COMPUSTAT).
*
Denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a 2-tailed t-test. ** Denotes significance at the 0.001 level using a 2-tailed t-test. *** Denotes significance at the 0.0001 level using a 2-tailed t-test. a Regressions are performed for the year firms are assigned to portfolios, year 0, and for the subsequent three years. All control variables in the regressions are contemporaneous with the dependent variable. The t subscripts refer to the year of the opinion (and control variables) relative to the year of portfolio formation (year 0). b Portfolios are formed using the refined accrual measure, Accruals 1 , equal to net cash flows from changes in working capital accounts as shown on the statement of cash flows (e.g. items 302, 303, 304, 305 and 307 in COMPUSTAT). Firm-year observations are ranked annually and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on Accruals 1 . c Unclean t is a dummy variable for audit opinion, and is assigned the value of 0 for an unqualified opinion in year t and the value of 1 for any other opinion, including qualified, adverse or unqualified with explanatory language (e.g., ability to continue as a going concern). The control variables are: Regressions are performed for the year firms are assigned to portfolios, year 0, and for the subsequent three years. All control variables in the regressions are contemporaneous with the dependent variable. The t subscripts represent the year of the auditor change (and control variables) relative to the year of portfolio formation (year 0). b Portfolios are formed using the refined accrual measure, Accruals 1 , equal to net cash flows from changes in working capital accounts as shown on the statement of cash flows (e.g. items 302, 303, 304, 305 and 307 in COMPUSTAT) . Firm-year observations are ranked annually and assigned in equal numbers to decile portfolios based on Accruals 1 . c ∆Auditor t is a dummy variable assigned a value of 0 for no auditor change during year t and 1 if an auditor change occurs during year t. The control variables are: 
